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Abstract
Let v be a vector of votes for parties and s a vector of their seats gained in the House of Commons or 
the House of Representatives. We use a single zero for the lumped category of “Other”, of the 
wasted vote, for parties that got votes but no seats. Let V = 1’v be total turnout and S = 1’s the total 
number of seats, and let w = v / V and z = s / S be the perunages (or per ten or percentages). Let d[w, 
z] be the inequality / disproportionality of votes and seats. This can be the angle between the 
vectors(AID) and the sine-diagonal (SDID) measure based upon this. Parties can also be scored with 
policy vector p, using a “left-to-right” policy scale [0, 10]. A common voter-legislative distance is the 
weighted average a  = p’ (z - w). With AID d[w, z] the present paper looks into the properties of d[p w, 
p z]. The latter term for variable w and z given p works as a disproportionality measure, and for 
variable p given w and z works as policy congruence. We can define an angular policy distance 
(APD) pd[w, z, p] that employs this d[p w, p z] properly. The APD is much more sensitive than the 
weighted average, but Sqrt[Abs[a]] has remarkably similar behaviour.
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1. Introduction
Votes and seats
Our target application concerns votes and seats. For example, the outcomes for Parties A and B 
might be votes = {4.9, 5.1} and seats = {5.1, 4.9}, both scores in the range [0, 10].
We use v for votes, s for seats. Their sum totals are V = 1’v and S = 1’s. The vectors w = v / V and z = s / 
S are called “unitised” to express that these vectors add up to 1 each. On occasion we will write w = 
U[v] and z = U[s] for this unitisation, e.g. when U[c z] might be shorter than c z / 1’ (c z).
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Normalisation to 10 rather than 1 or 100
For political science there is the choice between training students to grow sensitive to small num-
bers or create more sensitive measures that also allow direct communication with the larger public. 
For the Richter scale for earthquakes, the approach was to use logarithms, so that smaller values 
could be compared easier with larger ones. For our purposes the square root is adequate, with an 
easy change from 10 (grade) to 100 (percentage). 
For this subject of votes and seats it is better to use the grades in [0, 10], like votes = {4.9, 5.1}. The 
reason is that variables in [0, 1] causes leading zeros, while percentages in the range [0, 100] sug-
gest a degree of precision that is often overdone. 
For the scale we will use the symbol Ð (capital eth). For example w = Ð v / V. The default value in this 
paper is Ð = 10.
? UnitÐ
UnitÐx, f:Ð gives f x  Plus Absx
UnitÐClear unprotects and clears Ð
UnitÐSet, x sets Ð to the value x and protects
The default protected value of Ð is 10
? Ð
The default value is 10, but it might be reset, see UnitÐ.
Compare the use of as having the value 1100. Write ESCDESC or
"\CapitalEth". Pronounce here as "deka" instead of "eth", and 1  Ð as "decim"
UnitÐ49, 51  N
4.9, 5.1
1  Ð  10 Percent
1
10
 10 Percent
A distance d of inequality / disproportionality (ID) for votes and seats
There are two measures that translate into each other:
(1) A measure of association, proportionality or congruence has Ð (default 10) for a perfect match 
and 0 for a total mismatch.  
(2) A measure of distance, disproportionality or incongruence has Ð (default 10) for a total mismatch 
and 0 for a perfect match.
The common notion is distance but for votes and seats we would like to see equal proportions, 
whence we rather speak about an inequality / disproportionality (ID) measure.
The inequality / disproportionality measure d for votes and seats is independent of multiplication 
of the vectors by scalar multiples, with d[v, s] = d[w, z].
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Political science on electoral systems has provided various measures of distance between votes 
and seats, of which we will mention the two main ones just now: The Loosemore-Hanby measure is 
based upon the absolute difference (ALHID), and the Gallagher measure is based upon the Euclidean 
distance (EGID), both with corrections to get an outcome in [0, Ð]. For 2 parties these measures 
generate the same outcome. It appears that these measures have some drawbacks. My suggestion 
from econometrics and political economy is to use the angle between the vectors, which in particu-
lar gives the transformation into the Sine-Diagonal Inequality / Disproportionality (SDID), see Coligna-
tus (2017ac and 2018). 
For this present notebook it suffices to use a simpler indicator based upon the angle. Since the 
maximum angle between nonnegative vectors is 90 degrees, we can interprete the angle also as 
share of 90 degrees, scaled to Ð (default 10). This transform is called AngularID (AID).
For the following example, we have an inequality or disproportionality of votes and seats of 0.25 in 
[0, 10], or a quarter grade, or 2.5%.
? AngularID
AngularIDx, y gives the angular inequality  disproportionality. This is the angle between
real vectors x and y, divided by Pi2 radian or 90 Degree, times Ð. Output is in 0, Ð
AngularID4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9
0.254614
The angulare inequality / disproportionality is a bit more sensitive than the absolute difference.
? AbsLoosemoreHanbyID
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDv, s takes the absolute value of the
differences of UnitÐv and UnitÐs, divided by 2 to correct for double
counting: Ð 	 TotalAbsv  v'1  s  s'1  2. Outcomes are in the range 0, Ð
AbsLoosemoreHanbyID4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9
0.2
PM. Whether AID is simpler than SDID is a matter of view. Both are based upon the cosine between 
the vectors, that can be found from the improduct in linear algebra. The AID then applies ArcCos to 
find the angle. The SDID uses the Pythagorean Theorem and sin^2 + cos^2 = 1. Some might find the 
latter simpler. For the present discussion the interpretation that an AID of 0.25 means 0.25 * 9 
 2.5 
degrees can be appreciated.
Equal / proportional representation (EPR) and district representation (DR)
There are various electoral systems. The key distinction concerns systems with equal / proportional 
representation (EPR) and systems with district representation (DR). 
(1) With EPR we have z 
 w and d 
  0. For EPR, the distance d reaffirms that the system is EPR, and 
there our analysis essentially stops. For EPR, it is more relevant how far parties are apart for differ-
ent topics, see the research by Stokman et al. (2013).
(2) The distance d is mainly interesting for systems with DR.  In systems with district representation, 
there will be much strategic voting, because voters may fear that their vote is wasted on parties 
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there will be much strategic voting, because voters may fear that their vote is wasted on parties 
that have no chance of winning the district seat. A common strategy is to vote for the party that 
might win against the worst alternative. Thus the votes v do not reflect the true first preferences. In 
that case d[v, s] is biased and we should use d[v*, s], with the true first preferences v* and their 
shares w*. Political scientists are advised to have exit polls at (half) elections to get estimates for 
the true first preferences.
     Discussion of electoral systems: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82513/
A policy distance pd
Political parties have votes v and seats s, but can also be scored on a policy scale p, with its ele-
ments in [0, Ð]. In that case we get a policy distance pd[v, s, p]. A common term for such a scale is 
“left-to-right” even though those terms are rather out-dated. A basic reference is to Golder & Stram-
ski (2010). A left-to-right scale has much less detail than the more complex methods as mentioned 
by Stokman et al. (2013).
A common policy distance measure is the weighted average a = p'z - p'w = p' (z - w). Observe that a 
has the form pd[w, z, p] too. Another notation is to take the matrix of policy differences P = p - p’, 
and then find a = z’ P w. Under EPR a 
 0. Under DR this is biased again, and we actually should use 
a* = p’(z - w*) = z’ P  w*. 
PM. The weighted average a must be calculated correctly to keep it in the [-Ð, Ð] range. When a is 
calculated with unitised w and z, then p in [0, Ð] will cause that a is in [0, Ð] too.
Apparently the literature has little discussion of using d for measuring such a policy distance. While 
the weighted average adds the components p w and p z, we might consider to regard them un-
added. Thus, we might consider using d[p w, p z] and d[p w*, p z] or some related construct. Our 
terminology is:
(1) We call d[p w, p z] the angular policy term (APT).
(2) We will use the APT to construct an angular policy distance (APD). 
(3) An intermediate step between the APT and APD is the angular policy measure (APM). This APM 
will consist of m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z] on occasion but formally of m = max - d[p w, p z], with the local 
maximum, while for symmetric cases the maximum is d[w, z].
The comparison of a, d, APT, APM and APD is the major focus of this paper.
In the political science literature on electoral systems, the distance d[w, z] on the inequality / 
disproportionality of the votes and seats consisted historically out of the absolute difference 
(Loosemore-Hanby) or the Euclidean distance (Gallagher). Given the drawbacks of these measures, 
we might imagine an effort amongst political scientists to overcome such drawbacks by also look-
ing at a policy indicator p. Since 2017 there is a better measure d[w, z] for inequality / disproportion-
ality, based upon the angle between the vectors of votes and seats. Now the question arises what 
pd[w, z, p] would still improve about the analysis.
A ruling coalition
Parties can form a ruling coalition that commands a majority of the seats. Let c contain elements 1 
or 0, with 1 for a party in the ruling coalition and 0 for a party in opposition. In a common sense or 
business minded House, this c will depend upon topics for which such a majority can be bargained 
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for, with different c for different packages of topics. In a politically charged House, the divisions may 
be along ideological lines, whatever package, with more permanence about ruling parties and 
parties in opposition. 
In general there is the distinction:
(1) The voter-legislative distance. This is the case above, with use of d[w, z], pd[w, z, p] and a. Golder 
& Stramski (p95) w.r.t. a policy distance: “(...) substantively representative legislatures increase 
things like perceived levels of democratic legitimacy and responsiveness, satisfaction with democ-
racy, political participation, or personal efficacy and trust in the political process.”  
(2) The voter-executive distance. This might use d[w, c z] and pd[w, c z, p] as indicators. For a it is 
tempting to use a = p’ (c z - w). However, we should keep in mind that the weighted average 
requires unitised variables. Thus the proper formula is a = p’ (U[c z] - w). This is often called “voter-
government distance” but the government consists of executive, legislative and judiciary branches. 
The 2016 US House of Representatives as an example
The US (half) elections of 2016 for the House of Representatives generated the following distribu-
tions for the votes and seats, using the order {Democrats, Republicans, Other}:
votes  dem  61776 554, rep  63 173815, 128627 010  rep  dem;
seats  194, 241, 0;
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2016#Results_summary
Transforming these into grades and a plot:
vts  UnitÐvotes, sts  UnitÐseats  N
4.80277, 4.9114, 0.285837, 4.45977, 5.54023, 0.
ShowListLinePlot0, 0, 6 1, 1,
ListPlotMapThreadLabeled, Transposevts, sts, Dem, Rep, Other,
PlotStyle 	 PointSizeLarge, AxesLabel 	 "Votes 
Ð", "Seats 
Ð",
AspectRatio 	 1, BaseStyle 	 FontSize 	 13
The USA have district representation (DR) which differs from equal or proportional representation 
(EPR) (like in Holland). In a US district, a candidate is elected with the plurality rule. The votes for 
other candidates than the winner in the district are discarded. That the Democrats and Republicans 
are still relatively close to the 45 Degree line of equality or proportionality of votes and seats is the 
effect of geography, and perhaps the median voter theorem. The word “election” is over-used when 
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it refers to such different meanings for either district (DR) or equal / proportional representation 
(EPR). Given the discarding of votes in the system of district representation, we rather should speak 
about “half elections”. 
In district representation, there will also be more strategic voting, in which voters will not vote for a 
smaller party for fear that their vote will be discarded. This effect cannot be measured by the 
common inequality or disproportionality measures, since we only have the recorded votes and not 
the true first preferences.
A plot of the topic of this paper
Let us use arbitrary data on the left-to-right policy scale, and assume that the majority party forms 
the executive coalition.
policy  4, 6, 5;
coalition  SingleMajorityseats
0, 1, 0
The following plot gives the topic of this paper. The horizontal axis gives the voter-legislative dis-
tance, and the vertical axis gives the voter-executive distance. We have four distance measures:
(1) The angular inequality / disproportionality (AID), using d[w, z] and d[w, c z].
(2) The angular policy distance (APD), using pd[w, z, p] and pd[w, c z, p].
(3) The weighted average (WA), using p’ (z - w) and p’ (U[c z] - w).
(4) The sine-diagonal inequality / disproportionality (SDID): using sdid[w, z] and sdid[w, c z].
The SDID measure works as a magnifying glass for disproportionalities, and dominates the other 
outcomes. The USA has a SDID disproportionality in votes and seats of about 3.2 out of 10, or 32%. 
Observe that the US has DR. In EPR, we will see z 
 w, and thus the horizontal axis will be mostly 0.  
A question is what the measures contribute to the analysis, while it is already clear that DR is a 
suboptimal system. It would be better when the USA would switch to EPR and use the methods by 
Stokman et al. (2013).
AngularPolicyDistancePlotvotes, seats, policy,
coalition, PlotLabel 	 "2016 US House of Representatives"
The WA policy measure for the US is 0.1 on a [0, 10] scale, or 1%, which causus us to wonder 
whether the uncertainties in scoring this p would not dominate any analysis. Still, 0.1 is a significant 
figure for disproportionality in votes and seats (see the earlier discussion on 0.25).
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WAvPolicyDistancevotes, seats, policy,
WAvPolicyDistance10, 0, 0, 10, 0, 10  N
0.0971831, 10.
The WA voter-executive distance in this example is close to 1, meaning that the Republicans use 
their majority to implement policy at their position 6 rather than the country average. This measure 
only records the possibility, and does not suggest that it would be wise to do so.
An issue and an approach
This paper solves an issue on content and employs some didactics to do so.
On content: The issue is how d relates to a = p’ (z - w), with the question whether d[w, z] can be 
transformed into a policy distance pd[w, z, p], perhaps using d[p w, p z] or a related construct. 
On didactics: This issue requires three dimensions: v, s and p. Especially education is challenged on 
this. It appears that Mathematica allows us to better grasp the issues. Mathematica is a system for 
doing mathematics on the computer. It allows the combination of texts, symbols, numbers, graphs, 
patterns, motion, sound, etcetera. The following application again shows the power of using this 
integrated system.
Order of discussion
Historically, the political science on electoral systems before 2017 apparently was relatively 
unaware of the angular distance measure. For the policy distance the weighted average provided 
its services. Thus it is tempting to start the discussion below with this weighted average, as a 
common ground to start from. However, this would distract from the present news. (i) It is better to 
start with the construction of above new APD. (ii) Then we can return to the common ground on the 
weighted average. (iii) A combination of APD and WA is put into Appendix C. Before we start, 
though, it appears better to discuss: (0) the intended application and required properties.
Larger framework: 1W1V
This discussion forms part of a larger framework given by Colignatus (2017b): “One woman, one 
vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France” (1W1V). My diagnosis is that “political science on elec-
toral systems” is still in the Humanities and pre-science. This branch of political science relies more 
upon common language than upon sharp definitions that are relevant for empirics. An example is 
the use of the word “election” for any system, while so-called “elections” under DR are actually only 
“half-elections” since the votes are discarded that are not for the district winner (and one is sup-
posed to be “represented” by someone whom one explicitly did not vote for). On the other hand, 
there are also mathematicians who deal with their definitions abstractly, without a proper ground-
ing in empirical research. My invitation to empirical researchers is to help make a difference, 
notably in re-engineering the theory on electoral systems.
     https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82513/
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Routines in this notebook
? Cool`Voting`Angular`
Cool`Voting`Angular`
AbsLoosemoreHanbyID AngularPolicyTerm SineDiagonalID
AllZeroButOneQ CombinedPolicyDistance SingleMajority
AngleProxy Ð UnitÐ
AngPolMax EuclidGallagherID WAvAngPolicyMeasure
AngularID IndepAngPolicyDistance WAvPlot
AngularPolicyDistance MaxAngularPolicies WAvPolicyDistance
AngularPolicyDistancePlot PlusAngPolicyDistance WAvSqrtPolicyDistance
AngularPolicyMeasure PolicyNorm WebsterSainteLagueID
2. Inequality / disproportionality measures of votes and 
seats
Disproportionality measures
The  Absolute Difference (ALHID) and Euclidean Distance (EGID) measures are already used in the 
literature on votes and seats, and the sine-diagonal measure is a new suggestion from 2017. For this 
paper we use the simpler Angular Distance.
The literature uses values of ALHID and EGID in the [0, 100] range. We use the [0, 10] range here.
AbsLoosemoreHanbyID (ALHID)
? AbsLoosemoreHanbyID
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDv, s takes the absolute value of the
differences of UnitÐv and UnitÐs, divided by 2 to correct for double
counting: Ð 	 TotalAbsv  v'1  s  s'1  2. Outcomes are in the range 0, Ð
PlotAbsLoosemoreHanbyIDÐ  t, t, t, Ð  t, t, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
2
4
6
8
10
The LHID measure has the useful interpretation that it gives the share of displaced seats between 
parties for a House of Ð seats (corrected for double counting). In the US, 0.6 seats of a House of 10 
seats are displaced, more than 5%.
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AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDvotes, seats  N
0.628834
The ALHID distance is insensitive to the location of a 1 grade difference, say at {4, 6} or {9, 1}. 
ad1  AbsLoosemoreHanbyID4, 6, 5, 5,
ad2  AbsLoosemoreHanbyID9, 1, 10, 0, ad1  ad2  N
1., 1., 1.
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loosemore%E2%80%93Hanby_index
EuclidGallagherID (EGID)
? EuclidGallagherID
EuclidGallagherIDv, s takes the Euclided distance of UnitÐv and
UnitÐs, divided by Sqrt2 to correct for double counting. Outcomes are in the
range 0, Ð. For length 2 the outcome is the same as AbsLoosemoreHanbyID
PlotEuclidGallagherIDÐ  t, t, t, Ð  t, t, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
2
4
6
8
10
The 2016 US House data have 3 parties, and thus the EGID can have a different outcome than the 
ALHID. The US EGID is a bit larger than a half grade or 5%.
EuclidGallagherIDvotes, seats  N
0.545336
For two parties, the insensitivity is the same for EGID as ALHID.
ad1  EuclidGallagherID4, 6, 5, 5,
ad2  EuclidGallagherID9, 1, 10, 0, ad1  ad2  N
1., 1., 1.
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gallagher_index
Angular inequality / disproportionality (AID)
? AngularID
AngularIDx, y gives the angular inequality  disproportionality. This is the angle between
real vectors x and y, divided by Pi2 radian or 90 Degree, times Ð. Output is in 0, Ð
10     2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb
PlotAngularIDÐ  t, t, t, Ð  t, t, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
2
4
6
8
10
The 2016 US AID would suggest a disproportionality in the USA of 0.7 grades or 7%.
AngularIDvotes, seats  N
0.66848
The angular distance is sensitive to the location of 1 grade difference. It shows a halving or doubling 
of the angular distance, depending where one starts.
ad1  AngularID4, 6, 5, 5,
ad2  AngularID9, 1, 10, 0, ad1  ad2  N
1.25666, 0.704466, 1.78385
Because of this greater sensitivity the angular distance is a better measure for disproportionality 
than ALHID and EGID.
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angular_distance
Sine-Diagonal (SDID)
? SineDiagonalID
SineDiagonalIDv, s gives the Sqrt greater sensitivity of the Sine of the
angle between the vectors, multiplied by 10 to get rid of leading zeros, and with
the sign of Covariancev, s  1 for majority switches. Thus it ranges in 10, 10
If we do not look at input of opposites.
PlotSineDiagonalID50, 50, t, Ð  t, t, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
2
4
6
8
The input of opposites generates negative outcomes, indicating majority switches between votes 
and seats.
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PlotSineDiagonalIDÐ  t, t, t, Ð  t, t, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
10
8
6
4
2
The SDID measure is designed to be sensitive to disproportionality. For the US it gives 3.2 on a scale 
of 10, thus 32%. The SDID uses a magnifying glass like the scale of Richter on earthquakes does. 
(Smaller earthquakes are made comparable with the bigger ones.)
SineDiagonalIDvotes, seats  N
3.23746
The SDID is steeper than the AID, which makes the ratio of inner versus outer range values for the 
displacement a bit lower.
ad1  SineDiagonalID4, 6, 5, 5,
ad2  SineDiagonalID9, 1, 10, 0, ad1  ad2  N
4.4285, 3.32312, 1.33263
     https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81389/ 
3. Before and after (half) elections
Before the elections p and after the elections q
Suppose that parties announce their policy stance p before the (half) election and that the parties 
might change their policy stance to q after the (half) election. The relevant weighted average then is 
a = q’z - p’w under EPR and a* = q’z - p’w* under DR. In this case the policy difference matrix is P = q - 
p’, and a = z’ P q.
Using d we might consider using d[p w, q z] and d[p w*, q z] or some related construct.
Caveat
As a political economist, I regard it as “revealed preferences” (a term coined by Paul Samuelson) 
what parties people vote for and what policy those enact. When researchers try to determine what 
the “policy stance” p of the parties is on a scale of [0, 10] then it seems to me that this is opera-
tionally dubious and needlessly complicated, since we already have the essential distinctions 
between parties with their votes and seats, including the distance d[v, s] between them. Remark-
ably, some researchers who prefer a policy distance tend to regard the distance between votes and 
seats d[v, s] as devoid of much meaning, and they thus do not value the interpretation in terms of 
revealed preference. The present discussion thus only occurs because there is a section in the 
literature that tries to look into such a policy distance.
Perhaps there might be an argument for district representation (DR) that the policy measure p is 
useful as an alternative to trying to recover the true first votes v*. However, a = p’(z - w) still is based 
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useful as an alternative to trying to recover the true first votes v*. However, a = p’(z - w) still is based 
upon the actual votes. It would still be better to find w*. In that case d[w*, z] has only one uncer-
tainty w*, and this could still be a better measure than a* = p’(z - w*) with the two uncertainties of 
both w* and p.
That said, the after-elections change from p to q forms a challenge to the use of d. We might wonder 
whether we would still have the same parties, once they have changed position. While we do not 
need to join parties who have the same policy positions, since they might still be different in other 
aspects (like candidates), perhaps we must split parties when there is a tiny difference between p 
and q. Then, however, d quickly becomes 0. Thus, we reject the option to split parties (unless they 
do so themselves). Thus d[p w, q z] and d[p w*, q z] or some related construct might still be a rele-
vant approach to look into.
Combining coalition, views and changes of views
The following table combines above distinctions. We should not overlook the possibility of using 
d[w, z] and d[w, c z], thus not using p at all. When we include a policy indicator, then we distinguish 
between either using only p or using both p and q. Keep in mind that some formulas require unitisa-
tion U.
Before & after Only c p, c p, q, c
Legislative dw, z p p, q
Exec. Coalition dw, c z p, c p p, q c
This article assumes the left column and will tend to look at the voter-legislative distinction q = p, 
which concerns the middle column, with the use of c as a corollary. This paper is already rather 
involved, and thus we skip looking at q  p. Having good foundations on p however clarifies where 
changes must be made to allow for q.
Coalition, using d[w, c z] 
Let c contain elements 1 or 0, with 1 for a party in a coalition and 0 for a party in opposition.
When d[w, z] is the voter-legislative distance then d[w, c z] is a useful voter-executive distance.
Take above case of the US 2016 and let us assume that the Republicans form the ruling coalition. 
The voter-legislative distance, of almost 0.7 grades or 7%, changes into a voter-executive distance 
of 4.9 grades or almost 50%. This datapoint was already plotted in the graph in the Introduction.
AngularIDvts, sts, AngularIDvts, coalition sts  N
0.66848, 4.93444
The outcomes will tend to be around 5 off 10 or 50% in general. When votes and seats are in dead-
lock, then the random toss of a coin still produces this 5 off 10 or 50%.
deadlock  5, 5;
coalition  0, 1;
AngularIDdeadlock, deadlock, AngularIDdeadlock, coalition deadlock  N
0., 5.
The total outcome can still be 10 in extreme cases. When the first party gets 100% of the votes but 
doesn’t manage to get a majority in seats, then the voter-executive outcome is 10.
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AngularID10, 0, 4.9, 5.1, AngularID10, 0, 0, 1 4.9, 5.1  N
5.12731, 10.
The message may be that the distinction between 50% and 100% might be accurate but less infor-
mative than the description of the actual situation. However, we would use such measures in 
Comparative Political Systems, with regressions over nations, and then such numerical indicators 
could be of use.
4. Properties and first distinctions
Poperties for a policy distance
At this stage we can already identify properties that a policy distance pd[w, z, p] must satisfy:
(P.1) When w = z then pd[w, z, p] = d[w, z] = 0. This happens for a = p’ (z - w) and d[p w, p z].
(P.2) When all parties have the same policy p = Λ 1 then there is zero policy incongruence too. 
(i) This happens for a = p' (z - w), since Λ 1' (z - w) = Λ (1'z - 1'w) = 0. 
(ii) For p = Λ 1 then d[p w, p z] =  d[w, z]  0. Thus the latter does not satisfy this criterion for a policy 
distance. The term (APT) is not a distance (APD). Then we might consider m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z], 
and p = Λ 1 causes that m = 0. It appears that m might turn negative for asymmetric input, so that m 
by itself cannot be a distance.
(P.3) Extreme positions would be dubious to consider, like when two parties are opposed like p = 
{0, 10}, with one party fully on the left and another fully on the right. The weighted average then 
would give a = z[[2] - w[[2]], with the meaning of the difference in shares of seats over votes for the 
rightist party, which is a dubious statistic. For the weighted average, such an extreme p would be a 
selector of parties rather than weighing them (and using the left-to-right scale as the selection 
criterion). (The binary case would be symmetric though.) Also in such an extreme case d[p w, p z] = 
0, which makes some sense from its own logic, but which is still dubious, notably when we have 
extremes w = {0, 10} and z = {10, 0}. When p z = {0, 10} {10, 0} = {0, 0}, then we have the zero vector, 
and then there is no angular measure.
(P.4) When we consider symmetric cases, notably z = 10 - w in the plots below, then pd[w, z, p] and 
d[w, z] might show a regularity, like pd  d, yet there might be other outcomes for cases without 
symmetry.
First distinctions on content
On content, we may already introduce some first findings:
(A.1) We find that f[w, z ; p] = d[p w, p z] given p works like d[w, z], thus as disproportionality of votes 
and seats. Property P.1 is of key relevance here. The exception though is P.3 that blocks sensitivity 
to w and z. One option is to disregard the case, another option is to consider 0 as a local maximum.
(A.2) We also find that g[p ; w, z] = d[p w, p z] given w and z works like a policy congruence measure, 
and thus into the other direction. The congruence shows by moving from P.3 to P.2, when the 
congruence and the measure both rise.
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In an earlier text (2017b, p45 and its Appendix J) I suggested that the APT d[p v, p s] might be a 
policy distance itself. I retract this suggestion. This is only true for the perspective of f[v, s ; p] = d[p 
v, p s] or assuming a given p. There is another perspective for g[p ; v, s] = d[p v, p s]. A widening 
policy gap between parties does not increase but reduce the angle of vectors p v and p s, since the 
components actually come closer to each other. A clear example compares p = {0, 10} and p = {5, 5}. 
Thus d[p v, p s] is a measure of disproportionality given p, and a measure of congruence given v and 
s. However, this very phenomenon provides the suggestion of a useful transform of APT for the 
creation of a proper APD.
The following plots the perspective how the APT given v and s is a measure of policy congruence.
votes3  4.9, 5.1;
seats3  5.1, 4.9;
Plotpolicy  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDpolicy votes3, policy seats3 , r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	
"Policy stance\nfirst party 
Ð,\n2nd party opposite", "APT  dp w, p z"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð,
2nd party opposite
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
APT  dp w, p z
These are numerical outcomes for various policy positions.
policy  0, 10; AngularIDpolicy votes3, policy seats3,
policy  2, 7; AngularIDpolicy votes3, policy seats3 ,
policy  6, 6; AngularIDpolicy votes3, policy seats3   N
0., 0.134565, 0.254614
The angular policy term d[p w, p z] thus shows both policy incongruence and disproportionality for 
votes and seats. The design of an overall policy distance using this term thus is more involved.
Some technical issues
The graphical plots below tend to use opposite formulas, notably z = {t, Ð - t}, with t for the seats of 
the first party, and w = Ð - z. Yet we must be aware that w and z actually have some independence.
We will tend to use p = {r, Ð - r} with r the "right position of the first party". When r ranges over [0, Ð] 
then p runs from opposite policy positions to equal policy positions, to opposed policy positions again. 
Yet we should keep in mind that values like p = {7, 6} would be possible too.
When d[p w, p z] given w and z works as policy congruence, then perhaps d[(Ð - p) w, (Ð - p) z] might 
work as policy incongruence ? Indeed input Ð - p would run in the opposite direction of p. Or use 
d[w / p, z / p]. However, when p goes from opposite to equal to opposite, then Ð - p and Ð / p do the 
same. Using Abs[Ð/2 - p] would eliminate the left-to-right scale.
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Plotpolicy  r, Ð  r; AngularID
Ð  policy votes3, 
Ð  policy seats3 ,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\nfirst party 
Ð,\n2nd party opposite",
"APT  d
Ð  p w, 
Ð  p z"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð,
2nd party opposite
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
APT  dÐ  p w, Ð  p z
5. Basics of the Angular Policy Distance (APD)
Geometric mean of independent factors
The above mentioned the matrix of policy differences P = p - p’. A policy distance on P is the 
Euclidean norm, corrected for double counting (factor 2) and the number of parties (above 2). I 
write || p - p’ || though I haven’t checked all conditions of a formal norm. The following norm has 
basically the same scale as p, though there might be outliers.
? PolicyNorm
PolicyNormp scores the differences in policy positions p. Let m  OuterPlus, p,  p and
n  Lengthp, then output is Sqrtm^2  2 n1  Flatten  Total. This corrects for
double counting and the number of parties. Output has basically the same scale as p
For example, when there are four parties, and the first is fully rightist and the others are fully leftist, 
then the matrix of differences is as follows, and the policy norm is 10.
policy  10, 0, 0, 0; OuterPlus, policy, policy  MatrixForm
0 10 10 10
10 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
PolicyNormpolicy
10
For example, when p = {r, 1 - r} with r the position on a left-to-right scale [0, 1] for the first party:
PolicyNormr, 1  r  FullSimplify
1  2 r2
For example, when p = {r, Ð - r} with r the position on a left-to-right scale [0, 10] for the first party:
PolicyNormr, Ð  r  FullSimplify
2 5 	 r2
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This policy norm might violate the [0, Ð] range but such outliers can be neglected.
PolicyNorm10, 10, 0, 0  N
11.547
Appendix D discusses putting the policy norm on top of d[w, z]. 
This PolicyNorm neglects the weights of votes and seats. We can multiply the norm on policy with 
the angular distance on votes and seats. Multiplying values in [0, 1] with values in [0, 1] generates 
small numbers, while multiplying values in [0, 10] and [0, 10] generates high numbers. Thus we take 
the geometric mean as an operation that is neutral to the scale. See the following subsection for a 
plot.
? IndepAngPolicyDistance
IndepAngPolicyDistancev, s, p gives SqrtAngularIDv, s 	 PolicyNormp
IndepAngPolicyDistancePlot3D gives a 3D plot for s  t, Ð  t, v  Ð  s, and p  r, Ð  r
IndepAngPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9, r, Ð  r  FullSimplify 
PowerExpand  N
0.713602 5. 	 r
This independent combination neglects interaction though.
A proposed angular policy distance (APD)
To include interaction between w, z and p we combine the measure i of independent factors with (Ð 
- i) times a measure m = d[v, s] - d[p v, p s]. 
(1) When d[v, s]  d[p v, p s] then this still works as a distance measure for v and s, given p.
(2) When d[p v, p s] is a policy congruence term given v and s, and when x is independent of p, then x 
- d[p v, p s] gives incongruence.
Henceforth the proposed angular policy distance: APD = i + (Ð - i) m / Ð. The interaction is limited, 
yet this will be larger when the independent i is close to 0. It appears that m may be negative, but 
this value falls away against i. We first scale to 1 and then to Ð for output.
? AngularPolicyDistance
AngularPolicyDistancev, s, p combines i  IndepAngPolicyDistancev,
s, p  Ð, d  AngularIDv, s  Ð, t  AngularPolicyTermv, s, p  Ð. Output
is Ð i  1  i d  t. PM. It may be that d  t  0 but still 0  APD  Ð
The following plots the proposed angular policy distance (APD) (blue) and the underlying measure 
of independent factors (yellow). Given that the votes and seats are relatively close together in this 
example, the maximal distance can be only about 1.5 grades or 15% instead of 100% (of the 90 
degree angle). It appears that the interaction is only relevant for the larger differences in policy 
positions.
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PlotAngularPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9, r, Ð  r,
IndepAngPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9, r, Ð  r
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy position\nfirst party 
Ð\n& 2nd party opposed",
"Ang. Pol. Distance 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy position
first party Ð
& 2nd party opposed
0.5
1.0
1.5
Ang. Pol. Distance Ð
The above plot assumes symmetry. Let us consider non-symmetry. Let Party A lose the (half) elec-
tions in terms of the popular count but still win the House with a remarkable majority. We expect a 
sizable difference, unless the policy positions are the same with Party B. Let us assume that B has a 
policy position at 7. The following plots the value of the measure for various positions of Party A. We 
find the value 0 exactly at 7.
FindMinimumIndepAngPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 7, polpos, 4
FindMinimum: The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need more than MachinePrecision
digits of working precision to meet these tolerances.
4.95824  108, polpos  7.
The minimum that we found holds for both functions of course. 
PlotAngularPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9, r, 7,
IndepAngPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 5.1, 4.9, r, 7
, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	
"Policy position\nfirst party 
Ð\n& 2nd party at 7", "Ang. Pol. Distance 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy position
first party Ð
& 2nd party at 7
0.5
1.0
1.5
Ang. Pol. Distance Ð
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6. Properties and application of the APD
The US House 2016
The following two applications of the APD have already been shown in the graph in the Introduction.
Assume the policy scores of {4, 6, 5} for the Dem, Rep and Other parties on a left-to-right scale. Then 
the voter-legislative distance would be around 1.1 on a scale of [0, 10], or 11% of the full 90 degree 
angle.
AngularPolicyDistancevotes, seats, 4, 6, 5  N
1.13657
Assuming that the Rep have the ruling coalition, the voter-executive distance dp[w, c z, p] generates 
outcome 3.8 on a scale of [0, 10], or 38%. 
? SingleMajority
SingleMajoritys uses z  sTotals and returns
a vector, with 1 at a position i when zi  12, and 0 elsewhere
coalition  SingleMajorityseats
0, 1, 0
AngularPolicyDistancevotes, 0, 1, 0 seats, 4, 6, 5  N
3.80697
The former section already introduced the angular policy distance (APD), but let us look closer at its 
construction.
Plot of d[w, z]
The following plots get us acquainted with the relevant 3D space.
The above gave the 2D plot of the angular distance d[w, z]. In 3D, it is independent of p.
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDw, z, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dw, z"
Plot of Sqrt[ d[w, z] * ||p - p’|| ]
We first look into the policy distance created by independent factors.
The following plots Sqrt[ d[w, z] * ||p - p’|| ], or the geometric mean of d[w, z] and the norm of the 
policy differences between the parties ||p - p’||. This geometric mean provides a measure that 
combines disproportionality in votes and seats with policy differences. There are no interaction 
terms. 
? IndepAngPolicyDistance
IndepAngPolicyDistancev, s, p gives SqrtAngularIDv, s 	 PolicyNormp
IndepAngPolicyDistancePlot3D gives a 3D plot for s  t, Ð  t, v  Ð  s, and p  r, Ð  r
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
IndepAngPolicyDistancew, z, p, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dw, z  pp' "
Two properties are:
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(ad P.1) When w = z then we get d[w, z] = 0, which fits P.1.
(ad P.2) When p = Λ 1 then we get 0 too, which fits P.2.
These properties also apply to nonsymmetric cases, see the former section (with the 2nd party at 
position 7).
Plot of dp[w, z, p] or APD
The proposed angular policy distance APD combines the independent measure i with a dependent 
measure m checked by (1 - i), i.e. APD = i + (1 - i) m. The latter formula uses unitised variables, and 
thus must be corrected for the scale [0, Ð].
Here we only plot APD and then the next section will discuss the construction of m.
? AngularPolicyDistance
AngularPolicyDistancev, s, p combines i  IndepAngPolicyDistancev,
s, p  Ð, d  AngularIDv, s  Ð, t  AngularPolicyTermv, s, p  Ð. Output
is Ð i  1  i d  t. PM. It may be that d  t  0 but still 0  APD  Ð
Plot3Dz  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularPolicyDistancew, z, p, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "pdw, z, p "
Relating s to p
We want to be able to say that s is equivalent to some p, with equivalence now judged by having 
the same value of pd[v, s, p]. A statement like this is rather artificial, since its meaning depends 
upon our measures. However, once these notions are commonly accepted then this allows for such 
communication. Below we will look at different values of s and the resulting outcome of the angular 
policy distance.
Let us use the US House of Representatives (half) election results of 2016. Let us assume a policy 
stance of {4, 6, 5}.
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votes  dem  61776 554, rep  63 173815, 128627 010  rep  dem;
seats  194, 241, 0;
w  UnitÐvotes, z  UnitÐseats  N
4.80277, 4.9114, 0.285837, 4.45977, 5.54023, 0.
policy  4, 6, 5;
AngularIDw, z, PolicyNormpolicy,
pdorg  AngularPolicyDistancew, z, policy  N
0.66848, 1.73205, 1.13657
The (angular) disproportionality of votes and seats is 0.67 grade points. The policy norm is 1.7 
(approximately comparable to grade points). The angular policy distance is the geometric mean of 
these, 1.1 grade points on a scale of [0, 10].
Let us assume s  = {10, -10, 0} shift in seats in favour of the Democrats. 
newseats  seats  10, 10, 0
204, 231, 0
pdnew  AngularPolicyDistancevotes, newseats , 4, 6, 5, pdnew  pdorg  N
0.877463, 0.259108
eq  AngularPolicyDistancevotes, seats, 4, 6  dp, 5 
AngularPolicyDistancevotes, newseats, 4, 6, 5 ;
sol  FindRooteq, dp, 0
dp  0.832026
6  dp . sol
5.16797
Thus the equivalent of 10 seats more for the Democrats would be a shift in the policy stance of the 
Republicans of almost 1 grade to the left, from 6 to 5.2.
It would be stronger to argue for EPR though, when the distances would disappear.
AngularIDw, w  AngularPolicyDistancew, w, policy
True
Of course this only considers the voter-legislative distance. Also in EPR there still is a voter-executive 
distance.
7. Focusing on d[p w, p z] (APT)
Comparing the APD with APT d[p w, p z]
Having the APD pd[w, z, p], we can look now at the problematic APT d[p w, p z], using the APD as a 
yardstick, or as a proper distance measure that is sensitive to both policy and votes and seats.
The plot of d[p w, p z] provides a challenge. 
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dp w, p z "
The 3D plot can be supported by some sections at different values of r.
plaidrval :
PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r . r 	 rval ;
AngularIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "t", "dp w, p z ", PlotRange 	 0, Ð
GraphicsGrid plaid  0, .1, 4 
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
2
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dp w, p z
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2
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2
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dp w, p z
Let us confront d[p w, p z] (yellow) with the APD yardstick (blue), and remember that the APD is 0 for 
w = z and p = Λ 1.
2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb    23
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDp w, p z,
AngularPolicyDistancew, z, p
, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dp w, p z\n & APD "
We evaluate the properties of the APT as follows:
(ad P.1) When w = z then the value becomes 0 for any p. This is as desired.
(ad P.2) When all parties have the same position, then p = Λ 1, and d[p w, p z] = d[w, z]  0.  The latter 
will only be 0 when w = z.
(ad P.3) When p is extreme like {0, 10} for two parties, then the value becomes 0. Since only one 
party is selected, this tends to follow the logic of disproportionality d for any w and z.
votes3  4.9, 5.1;
seats3  5.1, 4.9;
policy  0, 10; AngularIDpolicy votes3, policy seats3 
 APT 
0.
However, the latter runs counter to the yardstick of the angular policy distance APD. 
AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, 0, 10  N
1.80965
In sum, the APT d[p w, p z] satisfies the property of being 0 on w = z, but it fails on the other condi-
tions for a policy distance measure. 
A plot of m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z] and its square root, for symmetric cases
There is the difference m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]. The following is still in the range [0, 10], but see 
below for negative outcomes for asymmetric cases.
Measure m is interesting because:
(i) Looking at m[w, z ; p], we see a difference between two disproportionality measures for w and z, 
given p, and we may still have disproportionality on balance, especially when m  0.
(ii) Looking at m[p ; w, z], the negative sign of - d[p w, p z] turns the policy congruence, given w and 
z, into policy incongruence.
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For symmetric input, m satisfies P.1 (w = z implies 0) and P.2 (p = Λ 1 implies 0). For P.3 at the 
extreme positions like z = {0, 10} and {10, 0} we find outcome 0 for any p, which runs counter to 
nonzero values for the APD.
Thus we see a graph that is more in accordance with the APD. What spoils the situation, however, 
are: (iii) the extreme values of w and z (P.3), and (iv) asymmetric cases (P.4) (see below).
Because of the latter drawbacks, we would tend to discard this m, but there is a potential applica-
tion in Appendix C, and hence we continue looking at its properties.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDw, z  AngularIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dw, z  \ndp w, p z "
We get a more pronounced profile by using Sqrt[m] = Sqrt[d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]]. PM. There is an effect 
of scaling, and we actually should use Ð Sqrt[m / Ð]. The following plot doesn’t have this correction, 
and  we find a maximal value around 3 only.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
SqrtAngularIDw, z  AngularIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " Sqrtdw, z  \ndp w, p z "
PM. At the extremes z = {0, 10} or {10, 0} both d[w, z] and d[p w, p z] are 10, and thus their difference 
is 0, except when p is extreme at {0, 10} of {0, 10} when the angular measure is undefined, when {0, 
10} {10, 0} generates input {0, 0}.
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policy  0, 10; AngularIDpolicy 0, 10, policy 10, 0
Indeterminate
For that reason, the following routine checks upon such extreme cases, and returns a proper 1.
? AngularPolicyTerm
AngularPolicyTermv, s, p gives AngularIDp v, p s, controlling for the
effects in this order: 1 if v  s, return 0, 2when p v or p s is 0, ..., 0, return Ð
AngularPolicyTerm0, 10, 10, 0, policy
10
Asymmetric cases for m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]
The above assumes symmetry. For asymmetric input m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z] may become negative. 
We may show this by plotting d for the two elements and then observe that d[w, z] does not touch 
d[p w, p z] at its maximum. Remember that the APT given w and z represents policy congruence.
votes5  9, 1 ; seats5  4, 6;
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDvotes5, seats5,
AngularIDp votes5, p seats5
, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\nfirst party", "Policy congruence"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party
1
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Policy congruence
A general routine for M = max - d[p w, p z]
Given v and s, we can determine the local maximum of d[q v, q s] with q in the unit simplex. Subse-
quently we can define a level and a relative measure M, that uses this maximum, to be distinguished 
from m. Let us also introduce an exponent f with default f = 1/2 (for the square root).
(i) APM[v, s, p] = (max  - d[p v, p s])^f, with max the maximal value of d[q v, q s] with q in the unit 
simplex. For symmetric cases max  = d[v, s], but this will be different for asymmetric cases.
(ii) RPM[v, s, p] = (1 - d[p v, p s] / max)^f. Appendix C discusses how this RPM can be combined with 
the weighted average a.
The following plot uses the routine AngularPolicyMeasaure, and generates Sqrt[d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]] 
as in the above, though now corrected for (1) the use of a maximum, (2) the proper scale Ð.
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Plot3Dz  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
AngularPolicyMeasure w, z, p, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "dp w, p z "
The following comparison of APD (blue) and APM (yellow) shows the asymmetry. APD is asymmetric 
itself and APM is fully shifted. Because of the maximum condition, the APM no longer satisfies the 
rule that p = Λ 1 implies 0.
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
AngularPolicyDistancevotes5, seats5, p, 
blue
AngularPolicyMeasurevotes5, seats5, p 
yellow
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\n first party 
Ð\n & 2nd party opposite",
"Policy incongruence 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð
& 2nd party opposite
2
4
6
8
Policy incongruence Ð
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? AngularPolicyMeasure
AngularPolicyMeasurev, s, p for vectors of votes, seats and policy positions. As fv, s ; given
p this is disproportionality of votes and seats, and as gp ; given v and s this is policy
incongruence. For symmetric cases the APM  0 when v  labda s andor p mu 1. The
option Level  True  False gives the level outcome, otherwise the relative default
True. Let APTq  AngularIDq v, q s. Let apt  APTp. Let mx MaxAPTqwith q
over the unit simplex, given v and s. With symmetry mx  AngularIDv, s. The level
outcome is Ð mx  aptÐ^fct. The relative output is 1  aptmx^fct, with fct taken
from the Exponent option default fct  12. See AngularPolicyMeasure"Results"
Option Symbol  True  False controls how the maximum is determined. If False: application of
FindMinimum on APTq. If True default: Option Max mx allows the choice: A numeric mx is
used directly, mx  Automatic uses mx  AngularIDv, s, and another value calls FindMinimum
which works for numeric v and s. A numerical value Max  Ð would turn the graph upside down.
PM. See AngularPolicyDistance APD that always satisfies APD  0 for v  labda s andor p mu 1
Potential relation between d[p w, p z] and d[w, p] and d[z, p]
We might get some information from the angles between the weights and the policy positions, 
namely d[w, p] and d[z, p]. Appendix A looks closer into the potential use of d[w, p] and d[z, p]. 
It is not quite possible to argue that when p is similar to w and z, or d[w, p] 
 0 
 d[z, p], then d[p w, p 
z] 
 d[w, z] too. The reason is that there might be quite some difference between d[w, z] and d[w^2, 
z^2].
PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t;
AngularIDw, z, AngularIDw^2, z^2,
t, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", " dw, z and dw^2, z^2 "
2 4 6 8 10
t
2
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dw, z and dw^2, z^2
8. The weighted average policy distance (WA)
The weighted average as an indicator
A measure of policy distance between the House and the electorate is the weighted average: 
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a = q'z - p'w = q . z - p . w, using different notations of the improduct, assuming unitised variables.
This may also be read as a = z . P . w, in which P = q - p' is the matrix of policy differences.
Assuming p = q for our case, gives a = p’z - p’w = p’ (z - w) = p . (z - w). 
The weighted average can have negative outcomes. It becomes a distance for Abs[a] = Abs[p . (z - 
w)]. The outcome a = 0 means high congruence and zero incongruence. Thus Abs[a] is a measure of 
incongruence and 1 - Abs[a] is a measure of policy congruence. We use Ð Abs[a] to compare with 
APD, or we use w and z in [0, 1] and p in [0, Ð].
The weighted average is zero, or a = 0:
(ad P.1) when z = w,
(ad P.2) when all parties have the same policy position, since p = Λ 1 gives Λ 1 ‘ (z - w) = Λ (1’z - 1’w) = 
0.
The discussion on the policy distance a thus may also be less relevant when the electoral system 
aspires at equality / proportionality (EPR), or z 
 w. This holds more in general for any distance 
measure, e.g. when (angular) distance d[p v, p s] is used, since d[p w, p w] = 0 too.
The issue gets more perspective when q  p. Then: (ad P.1) if z = w then a = q'z - p'w = (q' - p') w and 
(ad P.2) if p = Λ 1 and q = Μ 1, then a = q'z - p'w =  Μ - Λ. In the case of EPR these are relatively simple 
measures, and the complexity in DR is to find the w*.
The use of d[p v, p s] = d[p w, p z] fits the weighted average, as we may write a = 1’ (p z - p w). A 
distinction however is that the weighted average uses the levels of p z and p w, while those levels 
are immaterial to the angular inequaly / disproportionality distance.
Numerical example and the slope of the line
Suppose that Party A (“Democrats”) scores 4 on the policy scale and Party B (“Republicans”) scores 
6, and that the parties do no change position after the (half) election (p = q).
policy  4, 6;
votes3  5.1, 4.9; 
 unitise for a 
seats3  4.9, 5.1; 
 unitise for a 
electorate  policy . votes3  Ð, house  policy . seats3  Ð, house  electorate
4.98, 5.02, 0.04
The following is a visualisation of the weighted average. The LHS graph gives the votes, the RHS 
graph gives the difference between the votes and seats. The horizontal axis gives the policy posi-
tions of the parties. The heights of lines at the policy positions (green dots) gives the votes for the 
parties. The weighted average is in red. Primarily important is its horizontal position. Its height is 
given as the mean of the absolute values of the weights.
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GraphicsGridWAvPlotvotes3, policy, WAvPlotseats3  votes3, policy
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.3
In this arbitrary example, the electorate takes a position with a weighted average 4.98 slightly 
below the middle of the scale. The House takes a position 5.02 on average slightly above the middle 
of the scale. The change from votes to seats causes a shift of the overall policy position to the right. 
The latter is a dubious statistic, when the Republicans have a majority of 5.1 grades in seats, and 
thus might opt for a full-out policy at their level of preference on 6 of the "left-to-right" policy scale. 
This is actually the distinction between the voter-legislative and the voter-executive distances, 
mentioned above.  Supposedly political competition might force the parties to pursue policy 
around the middle, see also the Golder & Stramski quote above. In that sense the weighted average 
is still a useful statistic. 
The policy distance between House and electorate, or the weighted average, is a line, of which the 
slope depends upon the initial policy difference 6 - 4 = 2. When the Democrats begin with all votes 
and zero seats then the Republicans with all seats can shift the electoral choice at 4 to the policy 
average at 6. Observe the unitisation of w and z by Ð.
Plotz  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; 4, 6 . 
z  w  Ð, t, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Seats\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Seats
Democrats
Ð
2
1
1
2
Policy distance to the right Ð
The WA Saddle
For opposing policy stances p = {r, Ð - r}, with r the position to the right for the first party, we have a 
line for the weighted average a, of which the slope is determined from the difference 2r - Ð.  
Assuming opposing scores for votes and seats, the weighted average forms a saddle.
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
p . 
z  w  Ð, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " W. Av."
Thus US 2016 example
We had these votes and seats for the US House 2016 on a scale of [0, 10].
vts, sts  N
4.80277, 4.9114, 0.285837, 4.45977, 5.54023, 0.
The voter-legislative distance is only 0.1 grade or 1%.
policy  4, 6, 5;
electorate  policy . vts  Ð, house  policy . sts  Ð, house  electorate  N
5.01086, 5.10805, 0.0971831
The voter-executive distance a = p’ (U[c z] - w) in terms of unitised variables. 
coalition  SingleMajoritysts
0, 1, 0
majority  UnitÐcoalition sts
0, 10, 0
The voter-executive distance is almost 1 point, or 0.99 grade, or 9.9%. While the electoral average 
position is at 5, the Republican majority may execute their view at 6.
executive  policy . majority  Ð, executive  electorate  N
6., 0.989137
The maximal shift in policy positions from left-to-right is 6 - 4 = 2, and thus the 1 point of the voter-
executive distance is quite a distance, almost 50% of the maximum. However, a figure like 50% is 
not informative itself, since the true meaning depends upon the slope of the line.
Partial differences p and s
We can compare a slope along one dimension with a slope along another dimension.
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Consider the situation a =  p . (z - w) = p .(z - w), neglecting crossterm cases. We want to say that 
p is equivalent to some (z - w). This is not necessarily a very relevant topic for political science 
but it helps us to understand some of the properties of the weighted average and perhaps policy 
distance measures in general. 
We return to the binary case votes3 and seats3. 
For example: if the Democrats would get ds = 0.1 gradepoints more seats at the cost of the Republi-
cans, so that the prospective seats would be {5, 5}, then the policy distance would reduce to 0.02. 
This policy distance would also have been achieved if the Republicans had become less conserva-
tive at 5 = 6 + dp instead of 6 at the old seats. Thus the change in seats can be seen as quite a 
change in policy position (given the same reduction of the weighted average). Eliminating Ð on 
both sides:
sol  Solve4 , 6  dp . 
seats3  votes3 
4, 6 . 
 seats3  ds 1, 1  votes3, dp  Simplify
dp  0.  10. ds
 . ds 	 0.1
dp  1.
The shift from 6 to 5 would reduce the slope of the weighted average line. The Dems and Reps 
would be closer together on their positions, and thus the difference in votes and seats would have 
less of an impact. The policy distance in the new line at the old seats would be the same as the old 
line at the new seats.
To plot this, we need explicit functions, with 1 the old line (blue) and 2 the new line (yellow).
wavlin1t  
z  t, Ð  t; w  5.1, 4.9; 4, 6 . 
z  w  Ð   Simplify;
wavlin2t, dp 

z  t, Ð  t; w  5.1, 4.9; 4 , 6  dp . 
z  w  Ð  Simplify;

 the above was: sol  Solvewavlin24.9, dp  wavlin14.9  ds, dp 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dif  10 ds . ds 	 0.1;
new  4.9  ds . ds 	 0.1;
p1  Plot wavlin1t, wavlin2t, dif, t, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Seats\n Democrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð",
PlotRange 	 4.8, 5.2, .03, .06;
p2  Graphics Line new, 0, new, wavlin1new ,
4.9, wavlin24.9, dif, 4.9, 0  ;
Show
p1,
p2
4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2
Seats
Democrats
Ð
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Policy distance to the right Ð
9. Relation of the WA to ALHID and APD
The absolute distance measure
If the weighted average a = p . (z - w) is a sound measure for the policy distance between electorate 
and House, then Abs[z - w] might be seen as a good measure for disproportionality for the votes and 
seats. We are reminded of the Loosemore-Hanby (ALHID) measure. The measure gives the share of 
displaced seats, say the grades in a House with 10 seats, corrected for double counting.
Observe the distinction between Abs[p . (z - w)] and p . Abs[z - w] (not shown) and ALHID[p w, p z] 
(shown in Appendix B, and with internal unitisation of p w and p z). We will only plot the first here. 
Comparing the WA Saddle with ALHID[w, z]
The combination of the plots for the Loosemore-Hanby measure (going from 2D to 3D) and the 
policy distance saddle shows that Loosemore-Hanby is always larger than or equal to the weighted 
average saddle. This holds for this arrangement of two parties with opposite policies, and we may 
infer that this holds in general. ALHID already plots at range [0, Ð] and we correct a for it too.
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
p . 
z  w  Ð, AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z,
t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "Disp or\nW. Av."
The Loosemore-Hanby distance measure is less attractive as an indicator of disproportionality, see 
the discussion above. Whatever that be, we still regard the weighted average for the policy stance 
as a useful indicator. Above properties for the weighted average remain true whether we call Abs[z - 
w] disproportionality or not. 
Abs[p . (z - w)]
The absolute value of the weighted average Abs[a] = Abs[p . (z - w)] shows incongruence for policy 
and disproportionality for votes and seats. The measure satisfies:
(ad P.1) When w = z then Abs[a] = 0.
(ad P.2) When p = Λ 1 then Abs[a] = 0.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
Absp . 
z  w  Ð, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "AbsW.Av. "
The measure can be made more sensitive to smaller values by taking the square root. Observe that 
the correction for Ð now causes that it is mentioned in the variables themselves.
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
SqrtAbsp . 
z  w, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "AbsW.Av. "
The following repeats the two perspectives that we had for the angular distance, though specifying 
the formulas that use Abs.
(ad P.1) We may regard f[w, z ; p] = Abs[p . (z - w)] as a function of w and z, given some p. The greater 
the distance between w and z the more spread out f[w, z ; p]. Also, w = z will cause an outcome of 
zero, Abs[a] = 0. This means that f[w, z] given p behaves like a disproportionality measure d[w, z]. 
(ad P.2) We may regard g[p ; w, z] = Abs[p . (z - w)] as a function of p, given some w and z. When p = Λ 
1 then Abs[p . (z - w)] = Λ Abs[1 . (z - w)] = 0. The more extreme p (with opposite values r and Ð - r 
here, with ultimately p = {0, 10} or {10, 0}), the higher the maximum of g[p]. This means that g[p] is a 
measure of policy incongruence.
Thus from one perspective (votes and seats) we have disproportionality and from another perspec-
tive (policy stances) we have incongruence. 
For all practical purposes, it seems that Abs[a] seems a useful measure with a clear interpretation. 
The normal value a also includes the direction of change.
Comparing Sqrt[Abs[a]] and the APD
The following is a comparison between APD (blue) and Sqrt[Abs[a]] (yellow).
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PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p, SqrtAbsp . 
seats3  votes3
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\nfirst party 
Ð\n& 2nd party opposite",
"Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð
& 2nd party opposite
0.5
1.0
1.5
Policy distance to the right Ð
The following fixes the second party at 7, which allows less variation and generates a slightly lower 
outcome.
PlotEvaluatep  r, 7;
AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p, SqrtAbsp . 
seats3  votes3
, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\nfirst party 
Ð\n& 2nd party at 7",
"Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð
& 2nd party at 7
0.5
1.0
1.5
Policy distance to the right Ð
Retaining the sign of a for Sqrt[Abs[a]] 
It is an idea to retain the sign of a. The following plots a (red), the square root of its absolute value 
(yellow), the combination with the sign (green), and the APD for comparison (blue).
? WAvSqrtPolicyDistance
WAvSqrtPolicyDistancev, s, p first calculates the weighted averagewa WAvPolicyDistancev,
s, p and then puts out Signwa Ð SqrtAbswa  Ð, assuming that p is in 0, Ð
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PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r; wa  p . 
seats3  votes3  Ð;
AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p, Ð SqrtAbswa  Ð,
WAvSqrtPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p, wa
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\nfirst party 
Ð\n& 2nd party opposite",
"Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð
& 2nd party opposite
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
Policy distance to the right Ð
Parametric plot of Abs[p . (z - w)] and ALHID
The above 3D plot already showed how Abs[a[w, z, p]] and ALHID[w, z] relate. Perhaps in some 
cases a parametric plot might be helpful too.
ParametricPlotEvaluate
z  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z, Absp . 
z  w  Ð . r 	 4,
t, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "ALHID 
Ð", "Absa 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
ALHID Ð
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Absa Ð
ParametricPlotEvaluate
z  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z, Absp . 
z  w  Ð . t 	 4,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "ALHID 
Ð", "Absa 
Ð"
1 2 3 4
ALHID Ð
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Absa Ð
10. Conclusion
This paper belongs to the framework of Colignatus (2017b) (1W1V) of “re-engineering the political 
science on electoral systems”. To evaluate (half) elections, we can look at votes v and seats s but 
also at the policy stances p of the parties. We can distinguish the voter-legislative and the voter-
executive distances. The latter refers to the ruling coalition in the legislative.
The key distinction is between systems with equal or proportional representation (EPR) and those 
with district representation (DR). In the latter we only have half-elections. What might be seen as a 
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with district representation (DR). In the latter we only have half-elections. What might be seen as a 
single seat election for a district actually is inadequate for the multiple-seats election for the legisla-
tive. In a district, the votes are discarded that are not for the winner of the district, whence those 
voters are not represented in the legislative. Saying that those voters are represented by the winner 
whom they did not vote for, is changing the meaning of representation.
The traditional measures for inequality or disproportionality in votes and seats, as used in the 
political science on electoral systems, are the absolute difference (Loosemore-Hanby) and the 
Euclidean distance (Gallagher). This article uses the angle between the vectors, that is more sensi-
tive. This gives the angular inequality / disproportionality (AID). See Colignatus (2017a) for the use 
of the sine of the angle. For this present paper the use of the sine distracts from the main purpose.
The purpose of this present article was to see whether the angle might also be used for the policy 
stances p. When we have unitised vectors of votes w and seats z and AID d[w, z] then this generates 
the possibility to also use the angular policy term (APT) d[p w, p z], and this can be compared to the 
weighted average (WA) a = p’z - p’w. 
This paper suggested the angular policy distance (APD) pd[w, z, p]. The APD combines (1) the inde-
pendent factors of the policy distances ||p - p’|| and the inequality / disproportionality of votes and 
seats AID d[w, z] and (2) the interaction given by the APT d[p w, p z]. 
The following plot compares the angular distance (AID) (green), APD (blue) and the WA (red) and the 
WA square root (yellow), using votes v and seats s that are fairly close but that imply a majority 
switch, and policy positions p = {r, 10 - r}, with the policy stance of the first party r ranging in [0, 10].
votes3  5.1, 4.9; seats3  4.9, 5.1;
PlotEvaluatep  r, 10  r; wa  p . 
seats3  votes3  10;
 AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p,
SqrtAbswa  10 10, AngularIDvotes3, seats3, wa
, r, 0, 10, AxesLabel 	
"Policy stance\nfirst party 
10\n& 2nd party opposite", "APD & WA 
scale 10"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party 10
& 2nd party opposite
0.5
1.0
1.5
APD & WA scale 10
Some points are:
(1) The angular distance d[w, z] (green) does not depend upon policy, and indicates that votes and 
seats are disproportional. The outcome of 0.25 on a scale of 10 or a quarter grade is too large, and 
this political community is advised to switch to a better system of EPR.
(2) When the votes and seats differ only 0.2 points in absolute terms (corrected for double count-
ing), then the WA (red) can only range between [-0.2, 0.2], which means that the WA is not a sensi-
tive measure. Yet it has a sign and perhaps a more familiar interpretation as a policy distance.
(3) The APD (blue) is much more sensitive than the WA but without the sign. We might borrow the 
sign from the WA though, and flip the RHS.
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(4) The latter causes the question: why not boost the WA, like taking its square root (yellow) ? Here 
we could flip the RHS too. (This is the routine WAvSqrtPolicyDistance, above.) Perhaps WA contains 
all that we need, and the sqrt might also deal with the insensitivity of the ALHID.
The numerical values of the APD are new. Their meaning translates to the angle between the 
vectors. Their meaning is more “if the angular distance is a better measure for disproportionality for 
votes and seats, then the angular policy distance might be a better measure than the weighted 
average for policy stances”. One might get used to the numbers and see how they work out in 
practice, like one also has to get used to the meaning of the numbers in the Richter scale on 
earthquakes.
The Introduction contained a plot with values for weighted average and APD for the 2016 US House 
of Representatives, with the voter-legislative and voter-executive distances, for a guesstimate of 
the policy positions. The APD inserts another dot into the plot, compared to WA on policy and AID 
and SDID on disproportionality. Comparing AID and APD, the voter-legislative distance increases 
and the voter-executive distance decreases. It is too early to attach much meaning to these figures. 
One would have to look at results over more years to see whether this generates additional informa-
tion or has relevance for forecasts.
Overall, all these distances have little relevance for EPR when z 
 w. Nations in the world are 
advised to switch to EPR as in Holland. The findings above then might still have some use for 
comparing policy positions before and after (true) elections - but that is another topic. And we 
should not forget about the multidimensional analysis as in Stokman et al. (2013).
Appendix A. Using d[w, p] and d[z, p]
Plots d[w, p] and d[z, p] and their maximum Max[d[w, p], d[z, p]]
Since we have both the APD and the measure with independent factors (IndepAngPolicyDistance) 
itself, it is doubtful whether we should try to continue looking for another measure that involves 
interaction. However, the following was looked into in the past, and may be discussed, for it may 
provide another insight in non-independent interaction.
We may also consider d[w, p] and d[z, p]. These are based upon special angles, namelijk between 
the weights and the policy positions. In the weighted average a they are multiplied and added, and 
here we consider their angular distance. A high value in p might compensate for a low value in w, 
not in terms of politics but purely in terms of the numbers. For the following plots, we should 
remain aware of the presumed symmetries in these plots. We first plot for z and then for w, and 
then take their maximum value.
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDz, p, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dz, p"
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDw, p, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dw, p"
It appears that pd[w, z, p] = Max[d[w, p], d[z, p]] behaves somewhat as disproportionality for w and z 
given p, and behaves somewhat as policy incongruence for p given w and z. 
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Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
MaxAngularIDz, p, AngularIDw, p,
t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " Max "
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  1.34158107  attempted.
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  1.34158107  attempted.
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  1.34158107  attempted.
General : Further output of Max::nord will be suppressed during this calculation.
Let us consider the meanings of the angles between w and p on the one hand and z and p on the 
other hand. The “sink” shape can be explained as follows:
(1) If d[w, p] is small, then d[z, p] could be larger if d[w, z] is disproportional, and otherwise a smaller 
value is acceptable on both counts.
(2) If d[w, p] is large, then d[z, p] could be smaller if d[w, z] is disproportional, and otherwise a larger 
value is acceptable on both counts.
The following show that the maximum has drawbacks:
(ad P.1) When w = z then we need not expect the same outcome as d[w, z] = 0. 
(ad P.2) When p = Λ 1 then we need not expect 0 either.
This causes us to be wary of this as a potential measure of distance.
? MaxAngularPolicies
MaxAngularPoliciesv, s, p gives MaxAngularIDv,
p, AngularIDs, p, and note that this is not a proper distance
MaxAngularPoliciesPlot3D gives a 3D plot for s  t, Ð  t, v  Ð  s, and p  r, Ð  r
The above 3D plot assumes symmetry. Let is consider non-symmetry. In this case, Party A loses the 
(half) elections in terms of the popular count with {4.9, 5.1} but wins the House with a remarkable 
majority with {4, 6}. We expect a sizable difference, unless the policy positions are the same with 
Party B. Let us assume that B has a position at 6 on the left-to-right scale. The following plots the 
value of the measure for various positions of Party A. Remarkably, the minimum is not at 6 but at 
2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb    41
around 7, and the minimum is not 0.
FindMinimumMaxAngularPolicies4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 6, polpos, 5
FindMinimum: The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need more than MachinePrecision
digits of working precision to meet these tolerances.
0.691983, polpos  7.17136
In the following plot, policy positions polpos to the right of 7 for Party A do not contribute to a much 
higher policy incongruence, presumably because of the interaction between z = {6, 4} and p = 
{polpos, 6}. We first plot the two angular distances d[v, p] and d[s, p], and then their maximum.
GraphicsGrid PlotAngularID4.9, 5.1, polpos, 6,
AngularID 6, 4, polpos, 6,
polpos, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\n first party 
Ð", "dv, p, ds, p 
Ð",
PlotMaxAngularPolicies4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 6,
polpos, 0, Ð, AxesOrigin 	 0, 0,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy stance\n first party 
Ð", "Max"

2 4 6 8 10
Policy stance
first party Ð
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6
dv, p, ds, p Ð
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Max
Combined: geometric mean of independence and maximum
If we take the geometric mean of above two measures, the one using independence and the other 
using the maximum, then we make sure that there are zero outcomes at w = z and p = Λ 1. This 
combination generates a measure that meets our current specifications P.1 and P.2.
? CombinedPolicyDistance
CombinedPolicyDistancev, s, p gives the geometric
mean sqrt of IndepAngPolicyDistance and MaxAngularPolicies
CombinedPolicyDistancePlot3D gives a 3D plot for s  t, Ð  t, v  Ð  s, and p  r, Ð  r
The 3D plot is not perfect due to the Maximum condition. However, the zero’s are respected when w 
= z, even though the 3D plot does not show this. 
42     2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
CombinedPolicyDistancew, z, p, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " Combined "
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  2.10734108  attempted.
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  2.10734108  attempted.
Max: Invalid comparison with 0.  2.10734108  attempted.
General : Further output of Max::nord will be suppressed during this calculation.
CombinedPolicyDistancea, b, a, b, r, Ð  r
0
Non-symmetry
The above 3D plot assumes symmetry. Let is consider non-symmetry. In this case, Party A loses the 
(half) elections in terms of the popular count but wins the House with a remarkable majority. We 
expect a sizable difference, unless the policy positions are the same with Party B. Let us assume 
that B has a position at 6. The following plots the value of the measure for various positions of Party 
A. We find the value 0 exactly at polpos = 6. This works as expected, though the 0 is only approxi-
mate due to numerical routines.
FindMinimumCombinedPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 6, polpos, 5
FindMinimum: The line search decreased the step size to within the tolerance specified by AccuracyGoal and
PrecisionGoal but was unable to find a sufficient decrease in the function. You may need more than MachinePrecision
digits of working precision to meet these tolerances.
0.0149279, polpos  6.
A drawback seems that some properties of the Max function might carry over into the combination. 
However, the main drawbacks w.r.t. P.1 and P.2 have been eliminated. The outcome reflects the 
interaction between votes and seats and the policy positions. In the following, we plot both the 
independent measure and the combination. For the latter, the policy positions to the right of 6 for 
Party A do not contribute to a much higher policy incongruence, presumably because of the interac-
tion between z = {6, 4} and p = {polpos, 6}. The small curve towards point 7 has been explained 
above, with the same effect.
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PlotIndepAngPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 6,
CombinedPolicyDistance4.9, 5.1, 6, 4, polpos, 6, polpos, 0, Ð
2 4 6 8 10
1
2
3
4
The combined measure satisfies the conditions P.1 and P.2 for both disproportionality of votes and 
seats and policy incongruence. The behaviour has been shown in the plots with symmetry and 
asymmetry. The numerical outcomes could be accepted as is, even for the remarkable behavior at 
points like 7 above. When widely different combinations still have the same outcome of the mea-
sure, then this is just the outcome. 
However, the proposed angular policy distance APD in the main body of the text has a simpler 
structure without the numerically troubling Max condition, and such remarkable points like 7 
above. Thus the combination that has been discussed here finds only mentioning in this appendix.
Appendix B. d[p w, p z] for ALHID
An indicator d[p w, p z] for (i) congruence on policy and (ii) disproportionality 
on votes and seats
The following repeats the discussion for the APD, that uses the angular distance, now for the ALHID.
With d[w, z] as a distance measure, like the Loosemore-Hanby (ALHID) measure above, then d[p w, 
p z] may say something about the policy congruence or incongruence too. The plot for ALHID is 
quite similar to the plot for the APT.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "dp w, p z "
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The 3D plot can be supported by some sections at different values of r.
plalhidrval :
PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r . r 	 rval ;
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "t", "dp w, p z ", PlotRange 	 All
GraphicsGrid plalhid  0, .1, 4 
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t
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
dp w, p z
2 4 6 8 10
t
2
4
6
8
10
dp w, p z
2 4 6 8 10
t
2
4
6
8
10
dp w, p z
We again look at the two perspectives. We repeat the analysis so that this Appendix can be a bit 
more independent from the main body of the text.
(i) We may regard f[w, z ; p] = d[p w, p z] as a function of w and z, given some p. The greater d[w, z] 
the more spread out d[p w, p z]. Also w = z (here t = 1/2) or z = Μ w will cause an outcome of zero, 
since d[p w, p w] = 0. This means that f[w, z] (given p) behaves like the disproportionality measure 
d[w, z]. See below for the comment on the extreme values, given p on {0, 10} or {10, 0}.
(ii) We may regard g[p ; w, z] = d[p w, p z] as a function of p, given some w and z. When p = Λ 1 then 
d[p w, p z] = d[w, z]. (Here r = 5 gives p = 5 {1, 1}.) This need not be its maximal value, and the maxi-
mum need not be 10 either, though this happens to be the case in above (symmetric) plot, except 
for outcome 0 at p on {0, 10} or {10, 0}. The more extreme p (with opposite values r and Ð - r here), 
the lower g[p], with ultimately 0 for p = {0, 10} or {10, 0}. This means that g[p] is a measure of policy 
congruence. 
Thus from one perspective (votes and seats) we have disproportionality and from another perspec-
tive (policy stances) we have congruence. 
The exceptional aspects are: (a) The disproportionality levels might not be entirely comparable, 
since they depend upon p, (b) At the extreme cases of p like {0, 10} or {10, 0} the measure plunges to 
0, for any value of w or z. The reason is that at the extremes only nonzero p[i] w[i] and p[i] z[i] are 
compared, but also unitised, whence the compared vectors are the same. We might say that we 
actually do not have a measure here. The outcome of zero congruence for (ii) is okay however. Then 
the outcome for (i) may also be interpreted as that the disproportionality is 0 given that extreme 
value of p with zero congruence.
The ALHID measure
For the ALHID we also have a measure m = d[w, z] - d[p w, p z].
Let us use two properties now:
(1) For symmetric cases z = Ð - w, we (tend to) have d[w, z]  d[p w, p z]. Thus d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]  0 
is still a disproportionality measure, given p.
(2) With g[p] policy congruence and some value x that does not depend upon p, it follows that x - 
g[p] given w and z is a measure for policy incongruence.
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g[p] given w and z is a measure for policy incongruence.
Thus d[w, z] - d[p w, p z]  0 is both a measure of disproportionality for w and z and a measure of 
incongruence for p, in all their combinations. When we plot this, then we should see the same 
pattern as for Abs[a] = Abs[p’ (z - w)] but with more nonlinearity. The exception could be the develop-
ment of the values to the boundaries.
For the Loosemore-Hanby measure we find the following. The outcome is rather flat in the middle 
ranges, since d[w, z] and d[p w, p z] apparently are close together.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "dp w, p z", PlotRange 	 All
We get more sensitivity by taking the square root - but we need to keep track of the scale Ð.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r ;
Ð Sqrt
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z  Ð, t, 0, Ð,
r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", "Sqrtdp w, p z", PlotRange 	 All
This may be supported by some 2D plots. For extreme values of r, the outcome reduces to the 
ALHID measure itself. When r get closer to 1/2, then also Abs[a] gets a lower slope and lower maxi-
mal value (check the vertical axes), but ALHID[w, z] - ALHID[p w, p z] drops much faster. Also, the 
outcome becomes zero for opposite values of votes and seats, when ALHID[w, z] actually is Ð.
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plaidrval : PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
Absp . 
z  w  Ð, AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z .
r 	 rval , t, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "dw, z  dp w, p z "
GraphicsGrid plaid  0, 1, 4 
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Now using the Sqrt.
plaidrval : PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
Absp . 
z  w  Ð,
Ð Sqrt
AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z  Ð .
r 	 rval , t, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "Sqrtdw, z  dp w, p z"
GraphicsGrid plaid  0, 1, 4 
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Investigating a maximum
The above still uses symmetry. For asymmetry, we may have to look for a local maximum.
The following plots use the weighted average for reference (blue line, chech the vertical axis).
For a disproportionality index, the values at the extremes that curve back to the horizontal axis are 
problematic. This is just a possible answer: Max[d, Sqrt[d - dp]], avoiding a dependence like Max[a, 
Sqrt[d - dp]].
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plaidrval : PlotEvaluatez  t, Ð  t;
w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r; alhid  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDw, z;
Absp . 
z  w  Ð, Maxalhid,
Ð Sqrt
alhid  AbsLoosemoreHanbyIDp w, p z  Ð . r 	 rval ,
t, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "Maxdw, z, \nSqrtdw, z  dp w, p z"
GraphicsGrid plaid  0, 1, 4 
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At this point, we would start repeating the analysis for ALHID which we already did for the Angu-
larID. Since the latter has the better property of being more sensitive, there is no need to further 
develop the ALHID.
Appendix C. Combining WA with the RPM 
Combining properties
In Section 7 we defined the measures APM and RPM, to be distinguished from the distance APD.
The following combines the weighted average a with the RPM. 
wavapm[v, s, p] = a + a (1 - rpm) = a (2 - rpm ), with a = p . (z - w) for unitised z and w. When p is in [0, 
Ð] then a will be in [-Ð, Ð] and wavapm will tend to be so too.
The wavapm is a theoretical construct, and it is not clear whether it can be of practical use, whence 
it is put in this Appendix. The last subsection of this appendix discusses potential application.
Underlying properties 
The following starts with numerical examples. The APT d[p v, p s] for given v and s becomes smaller 
for more extreme values of p, whence it is a measure of congruence and whence a suitable trans-
form APD can be used for an angular policy distance.
Though we still have to construct the wavapm, the following table can already print its values.
Let us consider the outcomes of the APD, a, wavapm, APM and the APT. This next case assumes that 
the parties are still fairly close and that the angular distance is small. 
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votes3  5.1, 4.9;
seats3  4.9, 5.1;
differenceAndAnglep : AngularPolicyDistancevotes3, seats3, p, 
APD
p . 
seats3  votes3  Ð, 
 WA or a 
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes3, seats3, p, 
 wavapm 
AngularPolicyMeasurevotes3, seats3, p, Exponent 	 1, 
 APM 
AngularIDp votes3, p seats3 
 APT 
  N  Chop
policies  7, 2, 6, 4, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 8, 4, 6, 2, 7, 0, 10;
TableFormdifferenceAndAngle  policies, TableHeadings 	
policies, "APD", "WA", "wavapmv, s, p", "apmv, s, p", "dp v, p s"
APD WA wavapmv, s, p apmv, s, p dp v, p s
7, 2 1.23481 0.1 0.131335 0.120049 0.134565
6, 4 0.731773 0.04 0.0689112 0.0195672 0.235047
5, 5 0 0 0 0 0.254614
7, 7 0 0 0 0 0.254614
7, 8 0.50673 0.02 0.0381195 0.00225085 0.252363
4, 6 0.731773 0.04 0.0689112 0.0195672 0.235047
2, 7 1.23481 0.1 0.131335 0.120049 0.134565
0, 10 1.80965 0.2 0.2 0.254614 0
The table shows: (1) APT is low for high policy differences, and APT has a relative maximum when 
policies are equal, whence the APT is a measure of policy congruence.  (2) The APM is a transform 
Max - APT. (3) The APD and WA are measures of policy distance (taking the absolute values). (4) The 
wavapm behaves like the distance measures (taking the absolute values).
The measure wavapm combines the weighted average with the angular disproportionality of votes, 
seats and policy.
The following graph shows how the Democrats move from the left to the right, and the Republicans 
from the right to the left. The weighted average a generates a (blue) line and has a sign, given that 
the Republicans have 2% more seats. The (red) hill shape is d[p v, p s], thus actually congruence 
(given v and s), and it is not so high since the votes and seats are fairly close. Its oppositely curved 
(green) line is the level angular policy measure APM[v, s, p]. The combination wavapm (yellow) of 
the weighted average (blue) with the angular disproportionality (red or green) gives a stronger 
reaction of the policy distance (yellow compared to blue) to the disproportionality in votes and 
seats.
2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb    49
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r; RestdifferenceAndAnglep, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
Policy distance to the right Ð
A more involved discussion with three examples
The disproportionality between votes and seats affects the policy distance. Let us take three cases, 
and for reference plot the weighted average policy distance between House and electorate. The 
first case (blue) is almost zero and thus we plot with a factor 10. Check the positions at the 
extremes.
votes3  5.1, 4.9; seats3  4.9, 5.1; 
blue, use a factor 10
votes4  9, 1 ; seats4  1, 9; 
yellow
votes5  9, 1 ; seats5  4, 6; 
green
In all cases the Republicans have the House. When the Democrats would move to the left (r  < Ð - r) 
then the Republicans move the House position to the right of the electorate. When the Democrats 
would move to the right (r > Ð - r) then the Republicans move the House to the left of the electorate. 
(One might say that this happened in the abolition of slavery, with Abraham Lincoln a Republican.)
pav  PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
10 p . 
seats3  votes3  Ð, p . 
seats4  votes4  Ð, p . 
seats5  votes5  Ð
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
5
5
Policy distance to the right Ð
For the nonlinear plots, first consider d[p v, p s]. For ease we assume that the parties have opposite 
policy stances. The first case (blue) again is plotted with a factor of 10. Let us repeat some of the 
properties above, and remember that each curve assumes given v and s (though different per 
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curve).
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
10 AngularIDp votes3, p seats3, 
blue
AngularIDp votes4, p seats4, 
yellow
AngularIDp votes5, p seats5 
green
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy congruence 
Ð"
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Remarkably, the maximal values of d[p v, p s] are close to the maximal values of the weighted 
average a.
The following repeats the properties that we already saw above, now in a different context. 
(i) The graphs get lower, when moving from yellow, to green to blue. When w = z then the APT will 
be zero, since d[p w, p w] = 0. This zero outcome might still be seen as high policy congruence, since 
also d[v, s] = 0 and a = 0. The greater d[v, s] the more spread out d[p v, p s] too.
(ii) In a plot of d[p v, p s] as a function of p, the level of d[v, s] shows up as a horizontal line (shown 
above). When p = Λ 1 then d[p v, p s] = d[v, s]. This means that d[p v, p s] is not a mere measure of 
congruence but that its value must be related to d[v, s]. However, notice the effect of asymmetry, 
see below.
(iii) The wider the policy differences, the closer d[p v, p s] is to zero. When p has extreme values like 
{0, 10} then only those components will be selected, and the angle becomes zero. (Though we are 
looking at the binary case here.)
(iv)  When v and s have opposite formulas then the graph may be symmetric, but more common 
would be asymmetry or skewness, whence d[v, s] and d[p v, p s] need not always have the same 
maximum (check green at p = 1/2).
(v) Thus d[p v, p s] given v and s is a congruence measure and not an incongruence measure. Its 
interpretation is somewhat difficult, however, given that  d[p v, p s] given p is a measure of dispropor-
tionality. A high outcome still relates to a high value in disproportionality, and a zero might be 
caused by either high congruence (a = 0 because either w = z or p = Λ 1) or high incongruence 
(extreme policy differences like p = {0, 10}). 
Inverting above plot
It follows that APM[v, s, p] = max - d[p v, p s] inverts above plot, where the maximum differs per case, 
as an level measure given v and s. It is an important design matter to allow for different maxima. 
Just like the weighted averages have different slopes, the different disproportionalities between 
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votes and seats generate different shapes and such maxima.
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
10 AngularPolicyMeasurevotes3, seats3, p, Exponent 	 1,
AngularPolicyMeasurevotes4, seats4, p, Exponent 	 1,
AngularPolicyMeasurevotes5, seats5, p, Exponent 	 1
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy measure 
level 
Ð"
FindMinimum: Encountered a gradient that is effectively zero. The result returned may not be a minimum; it may be a
maximum or a saddle point.
2 4 6 8 10
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Ð
2
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Policy measure level Ð
While the weighted average gives a line, this angular policy measure gives curves, that also depend 
nonlinearly upon the disproportionality of votes and seats. The curves are less straightforward to 
interprete than the weighted average. The measure APM cannot be used as the distance APD, since 
it does not satisfy properties P.1 and P.2 though.
The relative meaure
The relative measure RPM[v, s, p] = (1 - d[p v, p s] / max)^f,  is made more sensitive by using a power, 
by default the square root (f = 1/2). For plotting we remove the factor 10 for the first case (blue). The 
relative measure is paradoxical. We would like to see that the score is higher when the dispropor-
tionalities are greater (yellow), yet here we see that the more proportional case (blue) has a higher 
score. The cause is that we have eliminated the impact of the maximum on the level score. Because 
of this paradox we would generally not use this particular relative measure.
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SetOptionsAngularPolicyMeasure, Level 	 False;
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
AngularPolicyMeasure votes3, seats3, p, 
 no factor 10 
AngularPolicyMeasure votes4, seats4, p,
AngularPolicyMeasure votes5, seats5, p
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy measure 
relatively 
1"
SetOptionsAngularPolicyMeasure, Level 	 True;
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Ð
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Combining the weighted average and the RPM
However, the relative measure can be used for the combination with the weighted average.  Let b = 
(a * rpm) be the basic combination. We might consider looking at a + b, but the present reasoning is 
otherwise. The difference of b with a is given as dif = a - b = a (1 - rpm), and we want to upscale a 
with this difference, as a + dif. Thus final output for the combination is a + a (1 - rpm) = a * (2 - rpm).  
In this case, we scale again for blue. Given that we use a as a policy distance, the present combina-
tion may be seen as a policy distance too (taking the absolute value).
pavang  PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r;
10 WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes3, seats3, p,
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes4, seats4, p,
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes5, seats5, p
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
5
5
Policy distance to the right Ð
The following combines the plots for the weighted average and the combination. (i) Since the 
relative angular measure is 1 at the extremes, the curves join up with the lines of the weighted 
average. (ii) They all pass through r = 1/2 since then the weighted average is 0. (iii) They all assume 
given v and s, and the different assumptions for v and s cause lines with different slopes. (iv) The 
interpretation is that the greater disproportionality (moving from blue to green to yellow) may 

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increase the policy distance above the value given by the weighted average, or wavapm  a. 
Showpav, pavang,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
5
5
Policy distance to the right Ð
Potential application
The wavapm is a theoretical construct, and it is not clear whether it can be of practical use.
Thus we now have these possible measures in terms of the weighted average:
(1) The voter-legislative distance is a = p’ (z - w). The weighted average assumes that parties will not 
take advantage of their majority in the House, and will heed the median voter. 
(2) The voter-executive distance is  a = p’ (U[c z] - w). This allows that the majority neglects the 
median voter (though its policy position might be at 5).
(3) Perhaps this wavapm provides some intermediate ground. The majority or even the dispropor-
tionality in seats might seduce the parties to take more risk w.r.t. the median voter. If so, then the 
exponent f may also be used to describe the degree by which this happens.
Let us consider the 2016 US House again. 
votes  dem  61776 554, rep  63 173815, 128627 010  rep  dem;
seats  194, 241, 0;
The assumed policy stances generate the following weighted average (voter-legislative distance). 
Since p is in [0, Ð], the weighted average a is so too. The outcome of a is rather low, but this derives 
from the slope of the line. 
policy  4, 6, 5;
policy . 
UnitÐseats, 1  UnitÐvotes, 1  N
0.0971831
The wavapm does not terribly raise the value over a. The weighted average is rather insensitive to 
the disproportionality in votes and seats, and the wavapm inherits that property.
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, 4, 6, 5
0.100147
The outcome of the wavapm may also be interpreted as an increase of seats for the Rep at the cost 
of the Dem, and then again calculating the new weighted average a. It turns out that it would make 
54     2018-02-02-PolicyDistance.nb
of the Dem, and then again calculating the new weighted average a. It turns out that it would make 
only 1 seat difference.
eq  policy . 
UnitÐseats  ds 1, 1, 0, 1  UnitÐvotes, 1   .
Abs 	 Identity  FullSimplify
1. ds  0.644625
Solveeq, ds
ds  0.644625
The plot shows that the wavapm is almost a straight line, and rather indistinguishable from a. Most 
plots in this Appendix use dramatic values for votes and seats and policy stances {2, 8}, and in this 
practical example we are more around the middle, where events are less dramatic.
PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r, 5;
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, p
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
Policy distance to the right Ð
A weighted average outcome of 0.12 would be tantamount to an increase of 5 seats for the Rep and 
a decrease of 5 for the Dem. 
eq  policy . 
UnitÐseats  ds 1, 1, 0, 1  UnitÐvotes, 1  0.12 .
Abs 	 Identity  FullSimplify
1. ds  4.96268
Solveeq, ds
ds  4.96268
eq  WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, 4, 6, 5, Exponent 	 f  0.12
362 510729 2  0.939936f
3730 183290
 0.12
fr  FindRooteq, f, 1  2
f  4.31999
The following plots the default value f = 1/2 (square root) (blue), this found value f = 4.32 (yellow) 
and f = 20 (green) for comparison. If this kind of exercise would be useful for practice (say predicting 
future behaviour) then it might be wiser to use a formal specification that is more sensitive around 
the middle and less sensitive at the extremes.
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PlotEvaluatep  r, Ð  r, 5;
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, p,
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, p, Exponent 	 fr1, 2,
WAvAngPolicyMeasurevotes, seats, p, Exponent 	 20
, r, 0, Ð,
AxesLabel 	 "Policy\nDemocrats\n 
Ð", "Policy distance 
to the right 
Ð"
2 4 6 8 10
Policy
Democrats
Ð
0.6
0.4
0.2
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Policy distance to the right Ð
Appendix D. ||p - p’|| on top of d[w, z]
The following is only to show the outcome when we would put the policy norm on top of the angu-
lar distance.
? PlusAngPolicyDistance
PlusAngPolicyDistancev, s, p puts an independent dp  PolicyNormp  Ð distance on top of
the d  AngularIDv, s  Ð, keeping the range 0, Ð, giving Ð Sqrtd 1  1d1dp
PlusAngPolicyDistancePlot3D plots 3D both d and the result, for s  t, Ð  t, v  Ð  s, and p  r, Ð  r
When p = Λ 1, then this measure is equal to d[w, z], and then it doesn’t satisfy P.2.
Plot3DEvaluatez  t, Ð  t; w  Ð  t, t; p  r, Ð  r;
AngularIDw, z, PlusAngPolicyDistancew, z, p
, t, 0, Ð, r, 0, Ð, AxesLabel 	 "t", "r", " dw, z &\np  p' on top "
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